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•SUMMARY
Service life extension of explosive devices used in aircraft escape systems can
achieve considerable savings. An overall approach is needed to challenge the logic
of explosive component service extension from design to removal from service for
evaluation. The purpose of the effort described in this paper was to develop a
service-extension approach on explosive devices used in aircraft systems, supported
by actual testing of representative candidate devices, to evaluate quantitatively the
effects of service, age, and degradation, and allow responsible, conservative service
life determinations. Evaluated were five explosive components: rigid and flexible
explosive transfer lines~';' one-way transfers, flexible linear shaped charges, and
initiation handles. The service extension approach generated in this effort is
summarized by eight recommendations.
INTRODUCTION
Extending the service life of explosive devices used in aircraft crew escape
systems provides an opportunity for considerable savings for a variety of military
and NASA aircraft. The rated service life of explosive devices for aircraft crew
escape has been established on a necessarily conservative basis, with an equally
cautious attitude toward service life extensions. Past service life surveillance
programs have relied on test methods that have provided limited information to estab-
lish the functional status of devices having full service and to project further
service extensions. The purpose of the effort described in this paper was to develop
a service-extension approach on explosive devices used in aircraft escape systems,
• supported by actual testing of representative candidate devices, to evaluate quanti-
tatively the effects of service, age and degradation, and allow responsible, conser-
vative service life determinations.
A wide variety of explosive devices have been successfully applied to virtually
all military aircraft to provide emergency escape for flight crews. For example on
the B-1B aircraft, initiation handles initiate both rigid and flexible explosive
transfer lines (the interconnected network used to transfer an explosive stimulus to
actuate all subsystems). One-way transfers isolate various portions of the network
by allowing the transfer stimulus to pass in only one direction. Flexible linear
shaped charges are used to sever the crew access ladder. Event sequencing is accom-
plishedby in-line time delays, which are slow-burning fuse elements. Mode selectors
allow the command pilot to select the ejection sequence of the four escape seats.
"And" gates assure that one escape event has occurred prior to another. Thrusters
are used to je~tison overhead canopies to allow clear passage for the ejection seats.
The establishment of the rated service life for military aircraft explosive
devices has been approached on a conservative basis because of the human-Ii fe-
critical function they perform. The concept that all explosives are unstable was
mistakenly extrapolated to the materials used in these devices, and consequently, a
relatively short service life was arbitrarily established. Since service evaluation
is normally accomplished by organizations that are separate from the design group, a
design for long service is generally not emphasized. Furthermore, little technology
exchange on service life has occurred among the various aircraft programs; as of 1981
the rated service life of rigid explosive transfer lines (ref. 1) typically ranged
from 3 years on the B-1 to 15 years on the F-16, with the rated service of most air-
craft systems established -at 5 years for essentially the same transfer line materials
and design.
Extending service not only provides cost savings, but can improve system reli-
ability. Removal and replacement (changeout) costs include removal of the aircraft
from service, transfer of the aircraft to and from refurbishment sites, procurement
of replacement components and a specially trained labor force.Changeout often
requires removing large sections of the airplane. For example, approximately
600 manhours are required to remove the nose section of the F-14 and to replace
approximately 150 explosive transfer lines. Approximately 40 000 manhours were
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required to de-mate the B-1 crew module and to replace the escape system, which
included 1200 transfer lines. System reliability can be improved by avoiding too
frequent teardown and replacement of explosive devices, with the accompanying
• potential of damage and improper assembly.
To benefit from an explosive device service extension, a number of surveillance
•
programs are being conducted. No acceptable method, such as elevated-temperature
"accelerated aging" (ref. 2), has been developed and substantiated to predict
reliably service life limits for explosive devices. The approach used by past
surveillance programs was to remove and replace devices on completion of rated
service. The removed devices were examined visually and by X~ray and subjected to
a repeat of all, or a portion of, the initial lot acceptance and qualification
testing. The devices were then functionally tested, (fired). Prior to the effort·
described in reference 1, functional testing was primarily on a "go/no-go" basis.
That is, the device did or did not function.
"Go/no-go" testing provides little information on the actual status of explosive
devices. If the device functioned, how well did it perform, or was there any change?
Can service life be extended, and if so, for how long? If the device failed to func-
tion, how, where within the device, and when did it fail? Was the failure caused by
a previously undetected design weakness, by improper installation, by service, or by
the removal process?
To answer these questions and allow service extension of explosive devices, an
entirely different philosophy than "go/no-go" is needed, starting with system concep-
inspection methods are needed to assure component readiness, (3) functional perform-
ance and chemical analysis methods are needed that are sensitive to small changes,
(4) a test approach is needed to gain confidence in service extension, and (5) a
method is needed to determine component failure mechanisms.
,
tion: (1) components should be designed for long-term use, (2) nondestructive
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This paper describes the extension approach applied to five different explosive
components with test results and recommendations.
TEST ITEMS
This section provides a generalized physical description with advantages and
disadvantages for long-term service for five explosive devices: rigid explosive
transfer lines, flexible explosive transfer lines, one-way transfers, flexible linear
shaped charge, and initiation handles.
Rigid Explosive Transfer Lines
Rigid explosive transfer lines, shown in figure 1, are completely sealed assem-
blies within stainless steel. Both ends (one shown in fig. 1) are identical. Highly
stable explosive materials are used throughout; the tips contain hexanitrostilbene
(HNS-I), with hexanitrobibenzy (HNBiB) and the mild detonating cord contains either
HNS-II (recrystalized HNS-I) or dipicramide (DIPAM). The cord sheath materials are
either silver or aluminum. The cord is fully supported within the steel tube. The
only disadvantage is that the thin walls (0.005 inch) of the booster tip require
careful handling during installation to prevent damage.
Flexible Explosive Transfer Lines
Flexible explosive transfer lines, shown in figure 2, are mechanically sealed
assemblies (crimped and potted). Flexible lines accomplish the same function as
rigid lines. The mild detonating cord contains HNS-II with a lead (Army application)
or aluminum (Air Force application) sheath. The cord is overlaid with polyethylene
tubing and fiberglass, which produces a relatively rugged structure. Disadvantages
are that the explosive materials are not hermetically sealed, the cords are subject
to undetectable damage by impact, crimping or flexing, and the thin-walled tips must
be handled carefully.
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One-Way Transfers
One-way transfers use HNS-I explosive materials that are contained in stainless
steel cavities as shown in figure 3. The cavities are hermetically sealed with a
stainless steel foil. There are no disadvantages in this design to prevent long-term
service.
Flexible Linear Shaped Charge
The flexible linear shaped charges evaluated in this program contained HNS-II,
and the sheath material was aluminum for the B-1, figure 4, and lead for the AH-1S.
The ends have thin-walled booster tips that are potted. The installation is fully
supported down the length of the charge to prevent environmentally induced damage.
However, the potted assemblies are not hermetically sealed.
Initiation Handles
A typical initiation handle, which is used to initiate rigid or flexible explo-
sive transfer lines, is shown in figure 5. This handle requires a 90° twist and pull
to compress the firing pin's spring. When the sear is pulled out of the body, the
firing pin is released and driven by the spring into the percussion primer. The
primer initiates lead azide, which detonates HNS-I in the output tip. The mechanical
interfaces are designed for long service, but the percussion primer is the weakest
link in the system. Primers are not·sealed and are sensitive to moisture and impuri-
ties, installation, age, temperature and mechanical environments.
PROCEDURE
Similar test methods and experimental approaches were applied to all devices •
Test Methods /
The devices were evaluated functionally and chemically as detailed in refer-
ences 1, 3, and 4. Velocity measurements were made of detonation fronts within
explosive columns and of explosively driven fragments at the output of devices, using
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"make" switches and electronic timing circuits. The output energy of several devices
was measured, using a piston/cylinder, crushing honeycomb apparatus. The status of
the explosive materials in the devices was determined using high pressure liquid
chromatography (HPLC), which provides the quantity of each explosive by weight in a
sample, color photographs, and scanning electron microscopy. Samples from each test
group were dissected at several points for analysis.
Flex and wrap tests were conducted on flexible explosive transfer lines. An
Army AH-1G application allowed crew members to use the lines as handholds. Service
conditions were simulated by hand pulls, followed by vibration. The Air Force speci-
fication required the lines to be wrapped around a 4-inch diameter cylinder. A total
of 2000 wrap cycles were conducted on an electrical motor-powered cylinder with an
axial load of 20 to 40 pounds on the line. The lines were held by elastic cords,
causing the load to increase as the cylinder rotated.
The cutting ability of the flexible linear shaped charge was determined, using
tapered 2024-T4 aluminum witness plates. The plates were 2 x 12 inches, tapering
down the length from 0.020 to 0.200 inch. Two simultaneous cuts were made on each
plate.
Experimental Approach
The explosive devices evaluated in this effort had both no service and full
rated service, being removed from active aircraft.
Nondestructive tests included visual examination and x-ray with helium leak
•
tests for sample groups of the rigid explosive transfer line end tips. Visual
examination and X-ray inspections were applied on receipt and after each
environmental test.
The "performance standard" groups were used to establish functional performance
and chemical composition standards against which all subsequent test groups were
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•compared. The most recently manufactured devices with the least service, preferably
new, were used.
Service life demonstration groups measured functional performance and chemical
composition following full rated service.
Repeat thermal qualification tests were conducted on several devices, following
full rated service to gain confidence in service extension. Mechanical environmental
tests were not conducted, since past experience had shown that the devices were
unaffected by qualification-level mechanical inputs.
Degradation investigations were conducted on a number of devices to determine
what chemical and physical changes take place as devices degrade, and how much
degradation causes functional failure. The only known method for inducing degrada-
tion was through exposure to elevated temperatures, since no age affect had been
proven.
The actual tests conducted on each device are detailed in the tables of results.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results of each explosive device will be presented individually. In
general, the inspection, functional and chemical monitoring methods were able to
detect small changes.
Rigid Explosive Transfer Lines
Evaluated in reference 1 were lines removed from the Army's AH-1G and AH-1S, the
Air Force's F-111 and B-1A, and the Navy's F-14. Table I for the AH-1S aircraft is
typical. All line types have excellent performance reproducibility. No detectable
change was observed, due to age or service, or full service with a repeat thermal
qualification. There is no apparent service limit. Degradation occurred only under
thermal conditions that were well above service requirements.
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Flexible Explosive Transfer Li.nes
The explosive materials in the B-1 line's mild detonating cord were signifi-
cantly degraded by 450 0 F annealing cycles (Table II) applied prior to manufacturing
of the cord to maintain necessary flexibility.* Both the B-1 aluminum-sheathed cord
and the Army's lead-sheathed cord have excellent performance reproducibility. Potted
tips (Army version) with no mechanical support loosened with service. The explosive
materials were unaffected by age, service, or full service with a repeat thermal
qualification. Chemical analyses revealed that the stability of the explosive in the
tips was superior to those in the rigid lines, since the tips vented. Hermetically
sealed tips, such as those on rigid transfer lines, prevent venting of decomposition
gases, accelerating decomposition.
The army's "handhold" problem induced 9 cords to part (and resultant failures-
to-function) in a sample of 120 units. These failures were simulated in laboratory
tests with hand pulls, followed by vibration exposure. Neither individual
environment alone caused the cord to part.
The Air Force's wrap tests caused 4 of 11 units to fracture the cord; two
functioned normally. Three units that had been sharply kinked, prior to testing,
suffered cord fractures in less than 1000 cycles. It was learned that the original
qualification tests were conducted by hand-wrapping with no axial load.
One-Way Transfers
The functional performance exhibited appreciable variations, as shown in
Table III, but meets specification requirements. No detectable change was observed,
due to age or service to 3 years, or full service with a repeat thermal qualifica-
tion. There is no apparent service limit.
*The degradation induced by annealing was indicated by the low quantity of
explosive (92.3%) in the service life demonstration test group, and confirmed by
color photography showing a darker than normal appearance. Furthermore, no group of
B-1 rigid transfer lines, containing the same material, exhibited such low quantities
of explosive.
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Flexible Linear Shaped Charge
The results of the B-1A flexible linear shaped charge are-shown in Table IV.
Both types tested had excellent performance reproducibility. Potted tips with no
mechanical support (B-1A) loosened with service. The explosive materials were
unaffected by age, service, or full service with a repeat thermal qualification•
Chemical analyses revealed that the explosive stability was superior to rigid lines,
since the end tips vented.
Initiation Handles
Demonstration tests were run on AH-1G arming/firing mechanisms after 5 years of
service. The firing mechanisms performed normally. The output tips produced
sufficient energy to initiate a booster tip for a rigid or flexible transfer line.
However, no attempt was made to evaluate the change in initiation sensitivity or
output performance of the percussion primer, (the element that would most likely
degrade). This evaluation would necessitate removal of the primers from the device,
which would be extremely difficult without damaging the primers. Furthermore, a
thorough evaluation could require hundreds of primers, due to the necessary statisti-
cal approach. No attempt was made to chemically evaluate the explosive materials,
due to the hazards of handling the lead azide in the booster column.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations from this program can be individually enumerated:
1. This test methodology (inspection, chemical, and functional) should be
incorporated into original specifications for lot acceptance, then used for
subsequent evaluation testing.
2. "Accelerated aging" should not be applied, since there is no verified rela-
tionship to age or service. Furthermore, this type of test can eliminate
completely satisfactory components because of unrealistic high-temperature
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exposures. Real-time exposures to actual high-temperature conditions is
acceptable.
3. The approach for service extension should be:
(a) Compare the requirements of the system with the state-of-the-art service
demonstrated by other systems.
(b) If the device has promising design features (stable explosives, seals,
insensitivity to environments, etc.), leave installed for rated service,
then evaluate a sample of the population from worst-case environments,
using the methodology described in item 1.
4. Rigid explosive transfer lines should be considered for service extension for
all applications.
5. Flexible explosive transfer lines should allow only thermal annealing cycles
that do not exceed 350°F. Since potting cannot maintain absolute seals with
service and units can suffer undetectable damage: tips should be mechani-
cally supported, the flexible lengths should be well supported, and protec-
tion from abuse should be provided. Service life extension should be
cautious. To allow continuation, assure that the service environment does
not vary appreciably from the previously demonstrated service conditions.
6. One-way transfers should be considered for service life extension for all
applications.
7. Flexible linear shaped charge applications should provide mechanical supports
of end tips to maintain seals and performance. Service extension should be
cautious. To allow continuation, assure that the service environment does
not vary appreciably from the previously demonstrated service conditions.
8. For initiation handles, percussion primers are the weakest component.
Service extension should be approached with extreme caution, due to the
difficulty in fully evaluating all explosive components, particularly the
percussion primer. A national need exists to incorporate an improved
10
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percussion primer before serious service extension can be considered. A
study is needed to subject a large sample of "improved primers" to real-time
aging under simulated-environment flight conditions •
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TABLE I. - FUNCTIONAL AND CHEMICAL ANALYSES OF RIGID EXPLOSIVE TRANSFER LINES ON AH-1S AIRCRAFT
[4.1 years service)
Average functional performance results Average chemical analysis results(standard deviation as percent of average)
Test group Manufacture Test Percent total explosive
date date No. Veloci ty, ft/sec by weight
test Energy , No.
firings Axial Side in-lb tested HNS-II/HNBiB HNS-I/HNBiB
Line fragment fragment in transfer line in booster tip
Performance 1/77 to 1 2/19 1/81 21 22 137 9 366 8183 511 2 97.0 99.8
standard (0.9 ) (11.4 ) () .6) (;2.3)
(no s&rvice)
Service life 4/11 to 2/78 6/82 20 22 126 10 511 8118 414 2 98.7 99.4
demonstration (1 .1) (10.8) (4.9) (11.9)
Repeat thermal 4/77 to 3/78 7/82
qualification:
-110°F for 72 hr 20 22 168 9 898 8614 442 2 99.1 99.8
(1 .3) (14.8)' (11.1) (16.5)
+200o F for 72 hr 20 22 804 10 459 8985 469 2 96.7 100.9
(0.9) (7.1 ) (4.9) (17.9)
Degradation 6/71 to 5/78
investigation:
375°F for 50 hr 2/81 12 22 944 9 415 8198 458 2 9~.8 98.0
(0.5) (11.3) (2.5) (23.4)
400°F for 50 hr 3/81 13 22 918 9 549 8249 a 446 4 88.0 94.1
(0.9) (12.5) (5.4) (6.0)
~ proPAgation failures at mid line.
TABLE II.- FUNCTIONAL AND CHEMICAL ANALYSES OF FLEXIBLE EXPLOSIVE TRANSFER LINES ON B-1A AIRCRAFT
[3 years service, aluminum sheath]
Average functional performance results
chemical analysis results(standard deviation as percent of average) Average
Test group Manufacture· Test Velocity, ft/sec Percent total explosivedate date No. by weight
test Energy, No.
firings Axial Side in-lb tested HNS-II/HNBiB HNS-I/HNBiBLine fragment fragment . in transfer line in booster tip
.B-1A service life 7/73 to 8/77 3/83 16 22 414 9780 8292 404.7 4 92.3 98.7
demonstration (1 .1 ) (14.1) (4.9) (21 .4)
Repeat thermal 3/73 to 8/77 6/83 11 22 601 9007 8782
--
3 96.7 97.9
qualification plus (1 .9) (9.9) (2.4)
200 wrap cycles
a Four units had transfer line cracks.
Two units failed to function.
... • •
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TABLE 111.- FUNCTIONAL AND CHEMICAL ANALYSES OF ONE-WAY TRANSFERS ON B-1A AIRCRAFT
[3 years service]
•
Average functional performance results Average chemical analysis results(standard deviation as percent of average)
Test group Manufacture Test Velocity, ft/sec Percent total explosivedate date No. by weight
test No.
firings OUtput tested
In body fragments HNS-I/HNBiB in input
Performance 9/77 9/84 10 13 772 8402 3 98.2
standard (13.9) (6.8)
(no service)
Service life 10/72 to 10/73 5/83 11 13 748 8250 3 99.3
demonstration (18.7) (9.0)
(aircraft 2)
Service life 7/75 9/83 21 14 368 8697 2 98.6
demonstration (23.2) (4.5)
(aircraft 4)
Repeat thermal 7/75 10/83 9 12 762 8876 1 98.6
qualification (17.4) (3.8)
TABLE IV.- FUNCTIONAL AND CHEMICAL ANALYSES OF FLEXIBLE LINEAR SHAPED CHARGE ON B-1A AIRCRAFT
[3 years service, 20 grains/foot, aluminum sheath]
Average functional performance results Average chemical analysis results(standard deviation as percent of average)
Test group Manufacture Test Percent total explosivedate date No. Velocity of by weight
test propagation Cut No.
firings ft/sec inch tested HNS-II/HNBiB HNS/HNBiB
in FLSC in booster tip
Performance standard 4/78 7/83 10 23_ 101 .146 2 100.7 99.2
(no service) ( .4) (5.1 )
Service life 6/73 8/83 10 22 942 .146 8 98.8 99.6
demonstration (.4) (6.8)
Repeat thermal 6/73 10/83 22 22 774 .141 2 100.9 99.6
qualification (2.0) (7.1 )
Degradation 6/73 -
investigation
400°F for 50 hr. 8/83 2 22 575 .149 1 98.8 96.3
425°F for 50 hr. 9/83 2 22 481 .149 1 99.5 99.1
450°F for 50 hr. 10/83 2 22 236 .135 1 99.8 99.8
• •
J •
• •
Teflon extrusion
Resistance weld Steel ferrul e
in.
Figure 1.- Cross section of rigid explosive transfer line (1 grain = 65 mg).
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Figure 2.- Cross section of B-1 flexible explosive transfer line.
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Figure 3.- Cross section of B-1 one-way transfers.
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Figure 4.- Cross section of B-1 flexible linear shaped charge.
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Figure 5.- Cross section of AH-1G arming/firing mechanism.
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